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Abstract 
 
 In this paper, we explore the issue on credit crunch from a comparative 
perspective.  Utilizing longer time series data, we investigate the existence of credit 
crunch in selected crisis-hit economies in East Asia over the period 1980-2002.  We 
detected some episodes of credit crunch both before and after the Asian economic crisis.  
These episodes after the Crisis are somewhat different from those detected by previous 
studies on the issue.  We, then, review the credit-crunch episodes in the broad 
macroeconomic context in order to assess our results in the longer-run perspective.  
We are well aware that financial liberalization has changed the financial environments 
of these countries more or less in due course.  Even so, the mixed results we obtained 
on the existence of credit crunch do not suggest that the impact of the austerity 
programs on financial intermediation after the Asian Crisis was ambiguous.  On the 
contrary, they implied that the impact of the programs were so severe that credit crunch 
or supply retrenchment was overwhelmed by a sharp fall in credit demand because of 
real and expected persistent overall economic depression. 
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I. Introduction 
 Financial intermediation plays a significant role in economic development.  In 
fact, the East Asian Miracle has been supported by financial intermediation rather than 
by capital markets.  The degree of financial intermediation, e.g. measured by broad 
money as a ratio to GDP, has been distinguishable from those in the other developing 
economies and regions.  In the rapidly growing East Asian economies, the corporate 
sector depends heavily on external sources of funds, especially from financial 
intermediaries given their limited internal funds to finance their vigorous investment 
needs.  We should note that this high debt-dependency of the corporate sector is the 
result of rapid economic growth and stable macroeconomic environment and not vice 
versa. 
 In the aftermath of the 1997 Crisis, however, the economic recovery in East 
Asia has not been supported by recoveries of domestic investment as well as bank 
credits.  Credit slowdown was apparent across all the Asian economies.  Triggered by 
the IMF-prescribed monetary tightening policy, it is believed that reduced credit supply 
further contributed to the already weakening economic activities in these countries.  
This mechanism is consistent with the pattern of causality between credit and real 
economic activity as proposed by the credit view (Bernanke and Gertler, (1995)).   
The basic tenet of this view is that banks’ supply of credit plays a significant 
role in the transmission of monetary policy to the real sector of the economy.  This is 
based on the assumption that assets in the form of loans are equally relevant as bank 
liabilities in the transmission of monetary shocks to the real sector of the economy.  
With a tighter monetary policy, banks respond by curtailing their supply of loans.  This 
arises from information asymmetries in the financial market as well as the imperfect 
substitutability between financial assets.  Thus, according to this mechanism, the 
leftward shift of the supply of loans explains the observed credit slowdown in the crisis 
period.  Put differently, the credit slowdown can be the manifestation of a credit 
crunch which may come from monetary tightening.  
Whether the high-interest rate policy led to a credit crunch in the 1997 crisis 
period has attracted interests among policy makers and researchers.  A number of 
empirical studies have examined whether and to what extent East Asian countries have 
been suffering from a credit crunch in the 1997 crisis period.  The basic approach is to 
model a demand and supply for loans and identify whether the observed data on loans is 
demand or supply determined.  A brief review of these studies is presented in the 
following section. 
 In this paper, we analyze the issue on credit crunch from a comparative 
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perspective.  To do this, we cover a longer time period to investigate different periods 
of credit crunch in East Asia.   In this study, we cover the period from 1980 to 2002.  
We detected some episodes of credit crunch both before and after the Asian economic 
crisis.  These episodes after the Crisis are somewhat different from those detected by 
previous studies on the issue.  We, then, review the credit-crunch episodes in broad 
macroeconomic context in order to assess our results in the longer-run view.   
This approach has the following merits.  Studies on the credit crunch in East 
Asia focused on the most recent experience when financial liberalization was at its peak.  
We are well aware that financial liberalization has changed the financial environments 
of these countries in the last two decades.  Covering longer periods, we will be able to 
compare the similarities and/or differences in the nature and causes of the most recent 
credit crunch with previous experiences.  Then, we may be able to understand the 
differential impacts of credit crunch in different financial environments. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section briefly reviews 
the literature on credit crunch in the East Asian countries after the Asian economic crisis.  
The third section explains the analytical framework that we adopt in the course of the 
analysis.  The fourth section presents the estimation results of the study.  The fifth 
section discusses the findings comparing recent credit crunch with previous experiences.  
The last section concludes the paper.  
  
II. Review of the Literature 
 Several studies investigated whether credit crunch occurred in the East Asian 
countries in the 1997 crisis period as a result of the high interest rate policy.  Ding, 
Domac and Ferri (1998) examined whether and to what extent East Asian countries 
have been suffering from a credit crunch.  They examined the evolution of several 
macroeconomic variables including monetary and credit aggregates as well as the 
spread between bank lending rates and rates on risk-free assets in identifying whether 
demand or supply is the binding constraint in the observed credit slowdown.  This 
framework has been applied to Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand.   
The main finding is that these East Asian countries suffered from an overall 
credit crunch although the situation differs considerably across the countries.  In Korea 
and Malaysia, the credit squeeze has been rendered more through a wider wedge 
between lending rates and risk-free asset yields.  In all countries, they also found 
evidence of a flight to quality, a situation where banks shift towards less risky assets 
(government securities). 
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Meanwhile, Ghosh and Ghosh (1999) used a disequilibrium framework to 
investigate a possible credit crunch in Indonesia, Korea and Thailand during 1997-1998.  
They used macroeconomic variables in their analysis with monthly observations from 
1992:1 to 1998:6.  Their main finding is that there is little evidence of quantity 
rationing at the aggregate level in all three countries.  Credit slowdown was mainly 
due to lower demand for credit and that the rising real interest rates and weakening 
economic activity were the main factors that lowered credit demand.   
In Thailand, although both credit supply and credit demand fell in real terms, 
estimated credit demand has generally fallen faster.  It is only in January 1998 did they 
find evidence of a credit crunch.  In Korea, excess credit demand in the first half of 
1997 became very small at the onset of the crisis then finally contracted sharply in late 
1997 and early 1998.  In Indonesia, there is evidence of a credit crunch only in 
November-December 1997.  Thereafter, there is no evidence of credit rationing. 
 In the study of single country cases, Kim (1999) also estimated a 
disequilibrium model of the bank loan market to identify the characteristics of the credit 
crunch and its intensity during the crisis in Korea.  The results of his study reveal that 
the loan market is characterized by a state of predominantly excess demand for loans.  
Additionally, he found that there has occurred a credit crunch right after the financial 
crisis in December 1997.  This finding is based on monthly data from January 1993 
through May 1998.  His findings support the idea that the marked decline in the 
aggregate bank credit is driven by a sharp decline in loan supply attributable to 
pervasive and stringent regulation on bank capital.   
Baek (2002) expanded Kim’s (1999) data set to cover from January 1992 to 
May 2001.  Using the same disequilibrium framework, he found the evidence of three 
periods of credit crunch prior to the crisis and a two periods of credit crunch after the 
crisis period. The three credit crunch periods prior to the crisis are 1992:2-1995:4, 
1996:1-1996:2 and 1997:1-1997:2 while the two credit crunch periods after the crisis 
are 1997:12-1998:3 and 2001:2-2001:4.  Higher credit risk and remaining uncertainty 
in the loan market were cited as the main causes of the recent credit crunch in his study.   
In the case of Malaysia, Beng and Ying (2001) estimated the extent of excess 
demand for loans during the recent currency crisis using the Johansen Cointegration 
technique.  Their empirical results identify the period from July 1997 to March 1998 as 
the credit crunch period with the tight monetary policy and erosion of banking 
institutions’ capital base as the main factors responsible for the retrenchment of loan 
supply.  Finally, Ito and Da Silva (1999) looked for empirical evidence of credit crunch 
in Thailand using a specially designed survey for commercial banks and their results 
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confirm the existence of a credit crunch.  Their study analyzed the developments in 
Thailand’s credit market during the 1997-1998 currency and financial crisis. 
 
III. Framework 
 In this paper, we define credit crunch as a situation where banks curtail their 
supply of loans at prevailing interest rates, resulting in a decline in the level of actual 
lending and an excess demand for loans.  Bernanke and Lown (1991) define a bank 
credit crunch as a significant leftward shift in the supply curve for bank loans, holding 
constant both the safe real interest rate and the quality of potential borrowers.  
Similarly, the Council of Economic Advisors (1991) defines credit crunch as a situation 
in which the supply of credit is restricted below the range usually identified with 
prevailing market interest rates and the profitability of investment projects (quoted from 
Ding, Domac and Ferri (1998)).  Two points can be inferred from the above definitions.  
First, credit crunch is primarily a supply phenomenon.  Second, it may be understood 
as a disequilibrium situation.  An abrupt change in the lending behavior of banks alters 
the relationship between credit availability and interest rates. 
A change in the lending behavior of banks may be generally due to factors 
affecting their ability to make loans and their willingness to supply loans.  In the 
former, regulations from the government play a significant role.  Such regulations may 
come in the form of higher cost of borrowing, higher reserve requirement ratio and/or 
capital adequacy requirements.  In the latter, expectations of overall economy and 
perceived credit risk of borrowers may significantly affect the reluctance of banks to 
supply loans.   Banks may then adjust their lending rates more rapidly and a 
significant widening of the wedge between the lending rate and a risk-free asset such as 
the government securities occurs.  Furthermore, their preference for more liquid assets 
may cause them to shift towards these less risky assets resulting in a further decline in 
the availability of loans.  In any of these cases, the relationship between the lending 
rate and the supply of loan is altered. 
 Based on the preceding perspectives, we employ a disequilibrium framework to 
analyze the behavior of the demand and supply of loans.  We characterize the credit 
market by the following equations 
D
t
D
ttt XiLD εααα +++= 321                       (1) 
                                            (2) St
S
ttt XiLS εβββ +++= 321
               ( )ttt LSLD ,min=Q                                (3) 
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where LDt is the real loan demand in period t, LSt is the real loan supply in period t, it is 
the real lending rate in period t, XDt and XSt are sets of explanatory variables affecting the 
loan demand and supply respectively, αi and βi are the parameters to be estimated and 
εDt and εSt are the error terms of the loan demand and supply functions, respectively.  
Using this framework, we proceed to develop the model by incorporating the different 
factors that affect the demand and supply of loans.  In this study, we specify the loan 
demand and supply functions as follows, 
D
tttttttt DLIPGAPIPiLD εααπααααα +++++++= −−− 7165141321
tttttttt DLGSECLCIPRi βββπβββββ ++++++++ −−− 918176514321
 (6) 
  
(7) 
S
ttLS εβ +=
where IP is the industrial production index, IPGAP is the deviation of current IP from its 
long-run trend, π is inflation rate defined as the percentage change in the consumer 
price index (CPI) over the previous year, R is the spread between the lending rate and a 
risk free asset (government securities), LC is the real lending capacity defined as total 
assets minus statutory reserves, GSEC is the real holdings of risk free assets and D is a 
dummy variable that controls for possible structural changes brought about by financial 
liberalization1.  Finally in the following we also include an interaction term between 
the dummy variable and the real interest rate in the estimated model, and some 
additional period dummies to cope with discontinuous changes in actual loans, which 
were the result from the fact that non-negligible amounts of Non Performed Loans were 
transferred to asset management corporations in the crisis period after 1997.  All real 
variables are deflated by the CPI.  Further details on the variables used in this study are 
provided in the data appendix. 
A number of points with regard to the above specification of the demand and 
supply functions merit some explanations.  First, in the demand function, we include 
the IPGAP variable to capture the borrowers’ need for additional working capital in 
times of adverse shocks in their production.  That is, when production temporarily falls 
relative to its long-run trend, the demand for credit may increase (Ghosh and Ghosh 
(1998)).  We measure the long-run trend of production using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter method.  IPGAP is therefore computed as current IP less its long-run trend.  
Second, we specify the production index and the IPGAP variables with one period lag to 
                                                  
1 The dummy variable takes on the value of unity from June 1996 in Korea, from February 1991 in Malaysia and 
from June 1992 in Thailand.  These periods account for changes in the interest rate policy in each country.   
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account for the simultaneity problem in the model.2  Third, we include a risk variable 
(R) in the supply function to account for the bank’s perceived credit risk of borrowers. 
Even with high lending rates, lenders may still be reluctant to lend because of high risk.  
Fourth, since both the borrowers and lenders make decisions simultaneously 
with other financial and portfolio decisions, a list of other stock variable that plays as an 
alternative to bank loans should also be included (Ito and Ueda (1981)).  In the supply 
function, we include government securities held by banks (GSEC) to account for their 
preference for risk-free assets as a major alternative asset in their portfolio decisions.  
This variable is also specified with one period lag to account for simultaneity problems.  
However, in the demand function, data availability do not permit us to do the same.  
Finally, we include the observed level of loans for the preceding period (Lt-1) as a 
predetermined variable.  This is consistent with the short-run optimal level in the 
presence of adjustment.  The variables are specified in log-levels except for the interest 
rates and the IPGAP. 
 We estimate the parameters of the model using the likelihood function and the 
maximum likelihood methods proposed by Maddala and Nelson (1974).3  We then use 
the parameters derived from this estimation technique to estimate the loan supply and 
demand and compare it with the observed level of credit.  By doing so, we will be able 
to determine whether the loan demand or supply is the binding constraint in the 
observed credit slowdown and identify whether credit crunch has occurred. We apply 
the above analysis to Korea, Malaysia and Thailand using monthly data over the sample 
period 1980 to 2002 (1983-2002 for Thailand).  
 
IV. Estimation Results 
Table 1 reports the parameter estimates of the loan demand and supply 
functions for each of the three countries. In the credit supply function, the coefficients 
of almost all the variables have their expected signs.  The real interest rate (i) has the 
expected positive sign, with an elasticity of 0.007 for Thailand, 0.005 for Malaysia but 
only 0.003 for Korea.  In all countries, the coefficient of the real interest rate is 
significant4.  The lending capacity (LC) is also robust across the three countries.  It is 
                                                  
2 We experimented including longer lags of the IP and IPGAP variables in the model. However, results from this 
experiment do not significantly improve the findings when only one period lag is included. 
3 While we recognize that the presence of unit root in the variables that we consider in this study may pose some 
problems in the estimates, unavailability of an appropriate technique at this point in time to handle nonstationary 
variables in disequilibrium analysis limit us to follow the conventional practice in the literature of specifying the 
variables in levels. 
4 The coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 % and 5 % level of significance in Malaysia and Korea, 
respectively.  In the case of Thailand, the coefficient is barely significant at the 10% level. 
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positive and it has an elasticity of as large as 0.79 in Thailand, while 0.07 in Malaysia 
and 0.07 in Korea.  The interest rate spread (R) which stands for the banks’ credit risk 
perception of borrowers has its expected negative sign.  However, it is statistically 
significant in Korea and Malaysia, while not necessarily so in Thailand.  The 
government security variable (GSEC) is statistically significant in all three cases. 
>>Table 1 around here 
For the other variables, we obtain some mixed results.  The industrial 
production index (IP) has the expected positive sign in Malaysia and Thailand and 
statistically significant, while in Korea it has the wrong sign (but statistically 
insignificant).  The inflation rate is positive and statistically significant in all cases.  
Finally, the dummy variables for financial liberalization have significant effects in the 
loan supply functions in Malaysia and Thailand.  For these two countries, the 
interaction term between the dummy variable and the real interest rate does yield 
significant effects.  This suggests that with smaller semi-elasticities of interest rates the 
loan supply has become less sensitive to interest rate changes.  Finally we detected a 
few significant discontinuous changes in loan supply in Thailand over the post-crisis 
period, which appears to reflect the above-mentioned asset transfers.5 
In the loan demand function, we obtained very robust results on the real 
interest rate and the inflation rate across the three countries.  The estimated coefficients 
of real interest rate (i) are negative and statistically significant.  They are 0.007 in 
Korea, and 0.008 in Malaysia and 0.005 in Thailand.  The inflation rate (π), which 
stands for macroeconomic stability, also has a statistically significant negative 
coefficient.  The elasticity is 0.006 for Korea, 0.007 for Malaysia and 0.004 for 
Thailand.   
The industrial production (IP), though statistically significant across the three 
economies, has a positive coefficient in Korea and Thailand but a negative one in 
Malaysia.  This may reflect two opposing effects.  A higher production level may 
reflect good economic conditions and therefore greater need for credit to meet 
expansion in business enterprises.  On the other hand, when production is higher, 
companies may have better cash flow and therefore may curtail their demand for credit.  
The output gap (IPGAP) has a significantly negative sign in Korea and Thailand and 
positive but statistically insignificant in Malaysia.  The dummy variable for financial 
                                                  
5 Our estimated coefficients of lagged dependent variables almost as large as one suggest very slow 
adjustment in both loan demand and supply.  Accordingly, while our independent variables are 
statistically significant, a large part of variations in loan demand and supply are explained by their 
own lagged variables. 
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liberalization is significant in all three cases.  Only in Thailand the interaction term 
between the dummy variable and the real interest rate is significantly positive, which 
suggests that the loan demand has also become less interest-rate sensitive.   
Overall, in comparison with the previous studies using the disequilibrium 
framework, our estimates yield more significant and theoretically correct signs in the 
variables of the loan demand and supply functions.  In Ghosh and Ghosh (1999), their 
estimates for the interest rate in the loan supply function yield a negative and significant 
coefficient in Thailand and positive but insignificant coefficient in Korea. In the loan 
demand function, their estimates for the interest rate in Thailand yield a negative but 
insignificant coefficient.  Similarly, Kim (1999) obtained a negative and significant 
sign for the interest rate in his loan supply function for the case of Korea.  Beng and 
Ying (2001) also obtained a negative and insignificant coefficient for the interest rate in 
their loan supply function for the case of Malaysia. 
Figure 1 plots the estimated loan supply and loan demand as well as the actual 
loan to the private sector.  Generally, our estimates yield a good correspondence 
between the actual loan to the private sector and the minimum of the contemporaneous 
loan supply and demand.  According to our estimates, Korea was mostly in excess 
demand for loans in the 1980s, and then mostly in excess supply since the mid-1990s 
onward.  Malaysia was generally in excess demand for loans except for the period 
1991-95.  Thailand was mostly in excess supply of loans in the years of 1994-97 and 
then persistently in excess demand after the Crisis.   
>>Figure 1  about here 
Now we are going to identify periods of credit crunch.  As said in the 
beginning of Section III, to identify credit crunch, the following three conditions must 
be met simultaneously:   
i) a decline in an estimated supply of loans,  
ii) a decline in the level of actual lending and  
iii) an existence of an estimated excess demand for loans.   
Therefore, by definition, there would be no credit crunch in Korea after the Crisis and in 
Thailand in the 1980s, where we detected excess supply of loans.  With this criterion, 
we can identify several months of credit crunch in each country as shown in Table 2. 
>>Table 2  around here 
In Korea, we identify two credit-crunch periods in the 1980s and four in the 
early 1990s, but none after 1997.  In Malaysia, two credit-crunch periods are identified 
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in the latter half of the 1980s and several periods after the Crisis, while in Thailand a 
few credit crunch periods in the 1980s and the early 1990s, and several after the Crisis.  
Finally, Table 3 summarizes the results on the existence of credit crunch in East Asia 
after the Asian Crisis including ours.   
>>Table 3 around here 
 
V. Discussion 
In this section we will discuss the episodes of our identified credit crunch in 
broader macroeconomic context.  Figure 2 provides macroeconomic and monetary 
developments in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand to facilitate mapping our estimated 
results onto the actual macroeconomic situations.  Note, that, according to some 
criterions in previous studies, Malaysia and Thailand experienced banking crises in 
1986 and 1983, respectively, but Korea barely escaped from it in the 1980s.6  Naturally, 
these banking crises have much to do with credit crunch, because banks would become 
more cautious in providing loans in the crises, part of which can be seen in our crunch 
episodes both before and after the Asian Crisis. 
>>Figure 2  around here 
As shown in Figure 2.a, in Korea, the first episode of credit crunch in the early 
1980s corresponds to the harsh adjustment after the negative growth in 1979 and its 
aftermath, when the economy transitioned from rapid, inflationary growth to mild, 
stable one.  Nominal credit growth showed a persistent decline along with lowering 
interest rates in this period.  The second episode of credit crunch in the early 1990s 
also witnessed a persistent decline in nominal credit growth with decreasing interest 
rates, reflecting the macroeconomic downturn, while the third episode occurred during 
the relative stalemate of credit and real economic growth in 1993.  Immediately after 
the Asian Crisis, we can see a sharper decline in credit growth, particularly in 1998, 
than these credit-crunch episodes.  Note, however, that this decline in credit growth 
was accompanied by a severe fall of real economic growth, which has never been the 
case in the previous episodes. 
The first episode of credit crunch in Malaysia was in the late 1980s, which 
                                                  
6 A “banking crisis” is defined as a period in which significant segments of the banking system become illiquid or 
insolvent (Kaminsky and Reinhalt (1999), Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) and (2003)).  Large scale bank failures, 
enactment of emergency measures by the government (deposit freezes, nationalizations, deposit guarantees, bank 
recapitalization plans), reports of significant depositor runs, the level of nonperforming loans and the costs of the 
bailout are among the evidences for a banking crisis. 
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roughly corresponds to the period of their banking crisis.  We can see persistent 
slowdowns of credit growth and a sharp fall of interest rates with economic slowdown 
(Figure 2.b).  We also see an acute fall of credit growth in the early 1990s, but without 
decreases in interest rates and economic activity, when we did not detect credit crunch.  
Then comes the credit crunch after the Asian Crisis with a persistent and sharp fall and 
then a stalemate of credit growth, along with lowering interest rates and negative 
economic growth. 
 If we presume that credit crunch is likely to occur together with a persistent 
and/or sharp decline of credit growth and falling interest rates, Thailand appears to have 
had potential credit crunch i) after their banking crisis in 1983, ii) in the early 1990s and 
iii) even before the Asian Crisis (Figure 2.c).  Actually, we detected credit crunch in 
those periods except for the pre-crisis period, when we identified excess supply of loans.  
In fact, while we see some falls of interest rates but little slowdown of economic 
activity in the three cases before the Crisis, in contrast, the fall of interest rates and real 
economic activity was unprecedented after 1997. 
  
VI. Conclusion 
Even within the framework of disequilibrium analysis of credit markets, we 
appeared to have witnessed mixed results in the literature as to the existence of credit 
crunch across economies in East Asia in the recent decades (See Table 3).7  Our result 
suggests that during the crisis period of 1997 through 1999, credit crunch appeared to 
exist in Malaysia and Thailand, but that is not the case in Korea.  How can we 
reconcile with these apparent contradicting results?  Recognizing the important role of 
financial intermediation as emphasized at the beginning of this paper, we suggest the 
following interpretations of our fact finding. 
First of all, it is obvious that Thailand was the most hard hit on the financial 
intermediation and then came Malaysia by the Asian Crisis among the three economies 
under our study.  The financial intermediary shrank on both the asset side and liability 
side in the two economies, which is contrasting to the Korean case after 1997 as well as 
to their own experiences of credit crunch or near-crunch before the Crisis.  The impact 
of the Crisis on the financial intermediation in Korea appears to be at least relatively 
mild to the other two and to its own experiences in the recent past.  Therefore, we 
                                                  
7 One might point out the limits of the analytical framework of disequilibrium analysis of credit markets here.  It is 
well known that these economies in East Asia have had a long history of financial repression, or at least financial 
restraint, where the price mechanism did not play a due role in fund allocation because of government regulations and 
other institutional rigidities until the early 1990s.  Partly, for example, coefficients of market interest rates are not 
necessarily stable in prior studies referred in this paper. 
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conclude that it is no surprise for us to detect credit crunch in Malaysia and Thailand, 
but none in Korea after the Crisis. 
Second, or more importantly, our results point to the overwhelming role of 
aggregate demand depression in generating significant declines of credits in East Asia.  
In fact, we should note that so-called V-shaped recoveries of East Asian economies 
since the Crisis were not achieved by the resurgence of endogenous private demands (i.e. 
consumption and investment), but barely supported by that of exogenous demands (i.e. 
world exports and fiscal stimulus).  Even as late as in 2002, we cannot witness the 
significant resurgence of domestic credits to the private sector in Malaysia and 
Thailand.   
 Thus, the mixed results on the existence of credit crunch do not necessarily 
suggest that the impact of the austerity programs on financial intermediation was 
ambiguous.  On the contrary, they implied, the impact of the programs might be so 
severe that even enormous supply retrenchment could be overwhelmed by an evermore 
sharp fall in credit demand because of real and expected persistent overall economic 
depression as in the case of post-crisis Korea.  Because credit crunch is, by definition, 
a mere difference between retrenchments of both loan supply and demand in the 
financial crisis. 
Lastly, as a caveat, we must be aware that there is a basic difficulty in 
identifying credit crunch within an aggregate macroeconomic framework, because there 
we cannot distinguish between good and bad borrowers and/or loans.  We cannot tell 
whether observed retrenchments in credit supplies were due to credit rationing against 
good borrowers or bad ones.  One way to amend this difficulty is to take a 
microeconomic approach such as a questionnaire survey of individual borrowers/ 
creditors as in Ito and da Silva (1999).  Even with microeconomic surveys, however, 
without reliable market risk premiums, we would not be able to have objective 
judgments on the existence of credit crunch. 
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Table 1: Parameter Estimates of the Loan Demand and Supply Functions
KOREA MALAYSIA THAILAND
Supply Function Supply Function Supply Function
Variable Expected Coefficient T-Stat
P-
Value Coefficient T-Stat
P-
Value Coefficient T-Stat
P-
Value
Constant -0.494 ** -2.267 0.023 0.433 *** 5.500 0.000 -1.139 *** -10.151 0.000
i + 0.003 ** 2.352 0.019 0.005 *** 4.670 0.000 0.007 *** 3.738 0.000
R − -0.002 *** -2.904 0.004 -0.004 *** -5.017 0.000 -0.003 -1.433 0.152
IP [-1] + -0.002 -0.106 0.916 0.034 *** 3.294 0.001 0.116 *** 3.669 0.000
LC + 0.074 *** 2.967 0.003 0.066 *** 3.295 0.001 0.797 *** 18.838 0.000
π − 0.002 * 1.804 0.071 0.002 *** 2.643 0.008 0.005 *** 3.468 0.001
GSEC[-1] − -0.018 * -1.899 0.058 -0.013 *** -2.634 0.008 -0.011 *** -4.215 0.000
LOAN[-1] 0<<1 0.979 *** 31.179 0.000 0.889 *** 43.314 0.000 0.259 *** 7.094 0.000
D -0.010 -0.649 0.516 0.049 *** 3.714 0.000 0.056 ** 2.138 0.033
D*i 0.000 -0.022 0.983 -0.004 ** -2.470 0.014 -0.006 ** -2.069 0.039
DC9803
*IP[-1] 0.005 ** 2.553 0.011
DC -0.015 -1.422 0.155
DC9803*R 0.004 * 1.882 0.060
DC9803 -0.023 ** -2.277 0.023
DC9802 -0.148 *** -8.522 0.000
DC0009 -0.089 *** -12.238 0.000
DC0106 -0.056 *** -9.414 0.000
DC0202 0.068 *** 10.334 0.000
Demand Function Demand Function Demand Function
Variable Expected Coefficient T-Stat
P-
Value Coefficient T-Stat
P-
Value Coefficient T-Stat
P-
Value
Constant 1.636 *** 3.831 0.000 -0.511 *** -2.816 0.005 -0.256 *** -4.609 0.000
i − -0.007 ** -2.148 0.032 -0.008 ** -2.546 0.011 -0.005 *** -7.139 0.000
IP [-1] + / − 0.214 *** 3.293 0.001 -0.068 ** -2.008 0.045 0.152 *** 8.736 0.000
IPGAP[-1] − -0.002 *** -2.788 0.005 0.000 0.302 0.763 -0.004 *** -8.686 0.000
π − -0.006 *** -2.794 0.005 -0.007 ** -2.076 0.038 -0.004 *** -4.301 0.000
LOAN[-1] 0<<1 0.790 *** 13.575 0.000 1.080 *** 37.459 0.000 0.961 *** 96.111 0.000
D 0.046 *** 2.561 0.010 -0.064 ** -2.457 0.014 -0.075 *** -5.194 0.000
D*i 0.003 1.051 0.293 0.001 0.488 0.626 0.004 ** 2.316 0.021
DC9803 -0.014 * -1.673 0.094
Sample Periods 1980:08-2002:09 1980:01-2002:09 1983:11-2002:12
Note: D, DC, DC---- are dummy variables.  D controls for changes in the interest rate policy in each country.  D
takes on the value of unity from June 1996 for Korea, from February 1991 for Malaysia, and from June 1992 for
Thailand.  DC controls for the effect of severe crisis.  DC takes one from March 1998 to October 1998.  DC----
controls for the structual changes in nominal outstandings of bank loan after financial crisis.  For example, DC9803
takes one from March 1998.  *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
Table 2: Credit Crunch Periods
Year KOREA MALAYSIA
1981 6-7
1986 Nov. Mar.
1980s 1987 5-6
1988 1-3
1989 Aug.
1990 Mar. Oct.
1991 Mar. Apr.
1990s 1992 May
1993 Mar.
1994 Jan.
1998 3-6 Dec. 2-4 Jul. 9-11
1999 1-4 11-12 Jun. Oct. Dec.
2000 Jan. Feb. Jun. 8-9 Dec.
2001 Feb. Feb. 5-6 9-10 Dec.
2002 May
THAILAND
Table 3: Summary of Results on Credit Crunch in East Asia in the 1997 crisis period
Korea Malaysia Thailand Data Frequency Coverage Period Methodology
Ding, Domac and Ferri (1998) Yes Yes none monthly 1997-1998 Observation on Macro variables
Beng and Ying (2001) --- Yes --- monthly 1993-1999 Cointegration
Ito and Da Silva (1999) --- --- Yes - 1997-1998 Survey
Ghosh and Ghosh (1999) none --- none monthly 1992-1998 Disequilibrium framework
Kim (1999) Yes --- --- monthly 1993-1998 Disequilibrium framework
Baek (2002) Yes --- --- monthly 1992-2001 Disequilibrium framework
Enya, Kohsaka and Pobre (2003) none Yes Yes monthly 1980-2002 Disequilibrium framework
Figure 1.a. Actual Loan and Estimated Loan Demand and Supply:
Korea
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Figure 1.b. Actual Loan and Estimated Loan Demand and Supply:
Malaysia
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Figure 1.c. Actual Loan and Estimated Loan Demand and Supply:
Thailand
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Figure 2.a. Monetary development: Korea
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Figure 2.b. Monetary development: Malaysia
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Figure 2.c. Monetary development: Thailand
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                                Data Appendix
Data are monthly and cover the period 1980:1to 2002:8 for Korea, 1980:1 to 2002:9 for
Malaysia and 1983:10 to 2002:12 for Thailand.
i
Real lending rate.
Lending rate deflated by CPI inflation
(computed as year on year
percentage change in CPI)
Nominal lending rate
CPI
60p, IFS
64, IFS
IP
Industrial Production, logarithm.Industrial Production
For Thailand, IP indices before
Jan 1987 are calculated using
production unit data. ∗1
66, IFS
For Thailand, Bank of Thailand
Monthly Bulletin, various
issues
IPGAP
Current Industrial Production less its
long-run trend.
(estimated by the Hodrick-Prescott filter
method)
Indu trial Production 66, IFS
π
Consumer price inflation rate.
(computed as year on year
change in CPI
CPI 64, IFS
L
Actual real loans.
(Loans on Private Sector by DMB deflated
by CPI)
Loans on Private Sector
CPI
22d, IFS
64, IFS
R
Risk.
Lending rate minus interest rate on risk-
free asset (gov rnment security)
Nominal lending rate
Treasury Bill Rate
60p, IFS
60c, IFS
LC
Real lending Capacity, logarithm.
(Total Assets minus statutory reserves,
deflated by CPI)
Total Assets
(Commercial Banks)
Statutory Reserves
(Commercial Banks)
Bank Negara Malaysia, Monthly
Statistics Bulletin, various
is ues
The Bank of Korea, Monthly
Bulletin, various issues
Bank of Thailand, Monthly
Bulletin, various issues
GSEC
Real holdings of Government securities,
logarithm.
(deflated by CPI)
Tr asury bills holdings
(Commercial Banks)
Government Securities holdings 
(DMB) for Korea
Bank Ne ara Malaysia, Monthly
Statistics Bulletin, various
issues.
The Bank of Korea, Monthly
Bulletin, various issues.
Bank of Thailand, Monthly
Bulletin, various issues.
*1: Weights computed as a proportion of the c mmod ty to total unit of production were used
to estimate IP indices before January 1987.
